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Abstract 
Prior research has demonstrated that cravings for substances, such as cigarettes and food, 
impair performance on basic cognitive tasks. This experiment examined whether these effects 
translate to impaired cognition on an important task in an applied setting: jury duty. Forty-six 
smokers were randomly allocated to a high-craving or control condition of an in-vivo 
procedure designed to invoke cigarette cravings. Participants were then asked to act as mock-
jurors, and read a written legal transcript based on evidence presented in an actual civil case. 
Later, participants were tested on their recall and recognition of information from the 
transcript. Participants in the high-craving condition recalled fewer correct facts from the 
transcript than participants in the control condition, but cravings did not significantly affect 
the recognition of trial information. These results are consistent with cognitive models of 
cravings, highlight the importance of providing jurors with sufficient breaks, and suggest that 
cravings may impair cognition in a variety of important applied settings. 
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Cravings can be defined as a motivational state that alerts an individual to the desire 
to consume a particular food or substance (Madden & Zwaan, 2001). Experiencing a craving 
impairs performance on basic cognitive tasks. For example, cigarette cravings have been 
found to affect reaction time (Baxter & Hinson, 2001; Cepeda-Benito & Tiffany, 1996; 
Sayette & Hufford, 1994), language comprehension (Zwaan, Stanfield, & Madden, 2000; 
Zwaan & Truitt, 1998), attention (Gross, Jarvik, & Rosenblatt, 1993), and working memory 
performance (Madden & Zwaan, 2001). Similarly, food cravings have been shown to slow 
reaction time and reduce working memory capacity (Kemps & Tiggemann, 2009; Kemps, 
Tiggemann, & Grigg, 2008). 
One influential model holds that cravings impair performance on cognitive tasks 
because the suppression of the associated consumption behavior requires cognitive resources 
(Tiffany, 1990). This model proposes that consumption behavior (e.g., smoking a cigarette or 
eating a chocolate bar) becomes automatic after many repetitions, and is stored in long-term 
memory as an action schema (Norman, 1981; Shallice, 1972). Action schemas for 
consumption can be activated by external cues (e.g., the smell of a cigarette) or internal cues 
(e.g., thinking about smoking) and, once activated, they require few cognitive resources to 
implement. In experienced smokers, this often results in automatized smoking behaviors 
(e.g., Field, Mogg, & Bradley, 2006). However, in some situations, action schemas are 
activated but cannot be implemented due to internal or external constraints; for example, 
when a smoker starts to think about smoking during a staff meeting at work. In such 
situations, cognitive resources must be used to consciously and deliberately suppress the 
implementation of the action schema. 
This notion—that the suppression of cravings uses cognitive resources and, hence, 
leaves fewer resources for other tasks—has links to other domains of research. The process of 
consciously suppressing an action schema (in this case, cravings) has been likened to dual-
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task performance (Cepeda-Benito & Tiffany, 1996), in which a person is required to perform 
a task while concurrently performing a second task. This necessitates allocating some 
resources to the second task, which leaves fewer resources available to direct toward the first 
task, resulting in effects such as increased reaction time on the first task (Baxter & Hinson, 
2001; Cepeda-Benito & Tiffany, 1996). Applied to (cigarette) cravings, these findings 
indicate that attentional resources are directed towards suppressing automatic smoking 
behaviors, leaving fewer resources for the current task. The idea that the suppression of 
cravings uses cognitive resources is also consistent with theory and findings in the broader 
literature on self-control (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Numerous studies have found that 
exercising control over thoughts and urges uses important cognitive resources, leaving fewer 
resources available for a concurrent task (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 
1998; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998). 
 The detrimental effects of cravings on cognitive performance have important 
implications for applied settings—such as workplace and educational environments—where 
smoking is prohibited for extended periods of time. In such settings, cognitive resources are 
used in performing countless tasks that have substantial consequences. Whether it is a factory 
worker using complex machinery (which carries obvious health and safety risks) or an 
accountant handling multi-million dollar investments of client-corporations, people rely on 
effective and efficient cognition to perform tasks safely and well. Research has identified that 
multiple trials on a task may lead to the task requiring fewer cognitive resources (i.e., 
becoming more automatic), enabling efficient performance despite some resources being 
allocated to the suppression of cigarette cravings (Madden & Zwaan, 2001). However, there 
are many instances in which the experience is unfamiliar and dynamic, with stimuli presented 
of varying complexity, and thereby requiring sustained, or greater cognitive resources. Given 
that cravings are likely to occur in many applied settings, it is important to understand how 
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the known effects of cravings on performance of basic cognitive tasks might translate to 
effects on more realistic cognitive tasks that more closely match what might be undertaken in 
applied settings.  
 In this research, we examined the effect of cigarette cravings on cognition in an 
important applied setting: Juror processing of trial evidence. The context of jury service is 
especially relevant for study of the effect of cravings on cognition. Effective jury service 
demands constant attention, efficient language comprehension, retention, manipulation, and 
accurate recall of information while suppressing emotional reactivity to stimuli in order to 
present an impartial decision (ForsterLee, Horowitz, & Bourgeois, 1993; Horowitz, Bordens, 
Victor, Bourgeois, & ForsterLee, 2001; Winter & Greene, 2007). Jurors are often exposed to 
complex and unfamiliar stimuli, thereby reducing the likelihood that cognitive processing of 
information and proceedings will become automatic. That is, jury duty requires a sustained 
level of cognitive effort to be maintained in order for jurors to be able to process complex 
information and, in turn, make accurate judgments about the case. In addition, many 
jurisdictions require jurors to go for extended periods of time without a break, increasing the 
risk and intensity of cravings. Furthermore, some smokers have been found to experience 
cravings within minutes of finishing a cigarette (Brody et al., 2002), and perceive the 
intensity of their cravings to increase if left unsatisfied (Sayette, Loewenstein, Kirchner, & 
Travis, 2005). Together, these findings provide further support for the notion that cravings 
likely occur in the courtroom, with important implications for individual contributions to the 
jury deliberation process. 
The primary aim of this research was to test whether cigarette cravings might impair 
jurors’ memory for evidence presented in a courtroom trial. Given that the ability to 
accurately recall and recognize evidence plays a crucial role in enabling jurors to form an 
appropriate verdict, it is important to identify any factors (such as cravings) that might impair 
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jurors’ memory for evidence. Prior research has shown that cravings impair performance on 
basic memory tasks (e.g., Kemps et al., 2008; Madden & Zwaan, 2001). Here, we examined 
the effects of cravings on jurors’ recall and recognition of details of evidence as might be 
presented in a civil case, which represents a considerably more naturalistic stimulus set and 
memory task than those used in previous cravings research. 
The secondary aim of this research was to test whether any effects of cigarette 
cravings on jurors’ memory for evidence varied depending on task difficulty. Previous 
research indicates that the effect of cravings may be moderated by the difficulty of the task. 
That is, more complex tasks place greater demands on cognitive resources than do simpler 
tasks. As the inhibition of cravings also takes up limited cognitive resources, we would 
therefore expect that cravings would give rise to a greater decline in performance on more 
complex than on simpler tasks. Indeed, Zwaan and Truitt (1998) found that the adverse 
effects of cigarette cravings on performance on a language comprehension task became 
greater as the task became more difficult. This suggests that any effects of cravings on jurors’ 
processing of trial information may also be moderated by task difficulty, with cravings 
impairing cognition to a greater extent as the jurors’ task becomes more difficult. 
To test this, we manipulated the complexity of the trial evidence presented to jurors. 
Prior research has demonstrated that evidence becomes more difficult for jurors to process as 
it becomes more complex; for example, as a result of numerous plaintiffs with individual 
injuries and claims in a civil case, or the presentation of evidence and legal principles of 
varying degrees of complexity and applicability to the trial (ForsterLee, Horowitz, & 
Bourgeois, 1994; Horowitz & Bordens, 2002; Horowitz, ForsterLee, & Brolly, 1996). Based 
on the reasoning outlined above, we expected that cravings would impair memory for trial 
information, but this effect would be more pronounced when the trial information is complex 
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(representing a relatively difficult cognitive task) than when it is simple (a relatively easy 
cognitive task). 
 In this study, we used an in vivo craving induction procedure to assess the effects of 
cigarette cravings on recall and recognition memory in mock jurors. We hypothesized that 
the presence of cigarette cravings would be associated with significantly poorer recall and 
recognition memory of information presented in a transcript of evidence and judicial 
instructions from a civil courtroom case. Additionally, we hypothesized that the effects of 
cravings on memory performance would be greater when the demands of the task were 
higher rather than lower (i.e., presentation of relatively complex versus simple evidence). 
Method 
Participants and design 
 Participants comprised 46 undergraduate students (15 males; 30 females; one sex-
undisclosed) aged 18 to 52 years (M = 27.39 years, SD = 8.95) who received course credit or 
AUD$10 for their participation. All participants reported that they spoke English as their 
primary language, were eligible for jury service (over the age of 18, Australian citizens), and 
had been regularly smoking ten or more cigarettes per day for at least one year  not taking 
into account variations in cigarette strength. Participants had, on average, been smoking 10 or 
more cigarettes a day for 9.57 years (SD = 9.26). Data from 10 additional participants were 
excluded from analyses on the basis that these participants primarily spoke a language other 
than English (n = 1), reported non-existent cravings for cigarettes (n = 2), or had CO breath 
readings that indicated they had not adhered to the experimental instructions (n = 7). 
Participants gave informed consent prior to participation, and were randomly 
allocated to one condition of a 2 (craving: high, low) × 2 (transcript complexity: simple, 
complex) design: control/simple transcript (n = 13), control/complex transcript (n = 12), 
high-craving/simple transcript (n = 10), and high-craving/complex transcript (n = 11). 
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Materials and procedure 
 Participants completed the study individually in a quiet laboratory room, with each 
testing session taking approximately 30 minutes to complete. Upon arrival, participants 
provided demographic information and a carbon monoxide (CO) reading via a handheld 
Bedfont piCO+ Smokerlyzer® unit. Typical CO levels for non-smokers range from 3 to 8 
parts per million (ppm), 10 to 25 ppm for light to moderate smokers, and 25 to 50 ppm for 
moderate to heavy smokers (Madden & Zwaan, 2001). Participants then underwent a craving 
induction procedure adapted from Sayette et al. (2005) that differed for high-craving and 
control groups. 
Cigarette craving manipulation 
Participants in the high-craving condition were asked to abstain from smoking for two 
hours prior to arrival at the laboratory and to bring with them their own packet of cigarettes. 
After providing a CO measure, high-craving participants were presented with their own 
packet of cigarettes and requested to remove one and look at it for 15 seconds while holding 
it comfortably in their preferred hand. The cigarette was then returned to the packet, which 
was left on the table in sight of the participant. 
 Participants in the control condition were instructed to continue smoking as usual 
prior to arrival at the laboratory. After providing a CO measure, control participants were 
presented with a roll of tape, and requested to hold it comfortably in their preferred hand and 
look at it for 15 seconds before placing it on the table (Sayette et al., 2005). 
Juror task materials 
Participants were then presented with a transcript of evidence and judicial instructions 
that was developed by Horowitz and Bordens (1988) and has been used in a number of 
investigations examining the effects of trial complexity and note-taking on juror decisions 
(ForsterLee et al., 1994; ForsterLee et al., 1993; Horowitz & Bordens, 1990; Horowitz et al., 
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1996). The transcript is based on a real civil case (Wilhoite v. Olin Corp., 1985), whereby a 
toxic chemical was inappropriately dumped into an area of commerce, resulting in injuries 
sustained by a number of plaintiffs. In mock-juror studies, presenting trial evidence via a 
written transcript produces results that are very similar to those found with more realistic 
presentation methods, such as using live actors in a mock-courtroom setting (Bornstein, 
1999; Kerr & Bray, 2005). 
In order to manipulate complexity, we used a procedure based on that used by 
Horowitz et al. (1996). Two versions of the transcript were created: a relatively simple 
version and a relatively complex version. The two versions differed in terms of the number of 
plaintiffs claiming damages (three plaintiffs in the simple transcript and six in the complex 
transcript) and the complexity of language used. For example, one phrase describing the 
concept of proximate cause appeared in the simple version as: “Proximate cause means the 
cause of an event, without such cause, the event would not have occurred.” In the complex 
version, the equivalent phrase was: “Proximate cause means that cause which in a natural and 
continuous sequence produces an event, and without which cause, such events would not 
have occurred; and in order to be proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be 
such that a person using ordinary care would have foreseen that the event, or some similar 
event, might reasonably result therefrom.” 
This method of manipulating complexity was found by Horowitz et al. (1996) to be 
effective, with jury-eligible participants rating the simple transcript as significantly more 
comprehensible than the complex transcript. Our own pilot testing (N = 22) confirmed that 
the simple transcript was perceived as easier to understand than the complex transcript. 
Unlike in Horowitz et al. (1996), however, this difference did not reach the conventional 
level of significance; the effect size was nevertheless moderate (simple: M = 24.00, SD = 
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15.66 vs. complex: M = 36.64, SD = 20.65, on a scale of 0-100 where higher scores indicate 
greater difficulty of understanding), t(20) = 1.62, p = .121, d = .69. 
Memory tests 
After reading through the transcript once, participants were presented with two 
questionnaires designed to measure different functions of memory. Recall memory for 
transcript facts was measured via written responses in which participants were asked to write 
down all information they could remember from the transcript. Participants were given three 
minutes to complete this task. All participants completed the task within the time frame. 
Recognition memory was measured via a questionnaire containing 30 statements 
about information from the transcript. Fifteen of these statements were correct facts from the 
transcript. The remaining 15 statements were lures, which consisted of information that could 
plausibly have appeared in the trial evidence, but was either incorrect or did not actually 
appear in the transcript. For each item, participants were asked to decide whether it appeared 
in the transcript they had read. Participants responded by providing a rating for each item 
from 1 (“definitely appeared”), to 6 (“definitely did not appear”), indicating their level of 
confidence regarding the presence of each statement in the transcript. 
Manipulation checks and other measures 
To test whether the craving manipulation was successful, participants provided 
measures of state-craving intensity via responses on three 100-mm visual analogue scales 
anchored at 0 (“absolutely no urge to smoke”) and 100 (“strongest urge to smoke I’ve ever 
experienced”). These three measures were taken retrospectively, such that participants were 
asked to indicate the intensity of cigarette cravings that they had experienced at three 
different time points during testing: (1) upon arrival to the lab, (2) following the craving 
manipulation only a few minutes later, and (3) approximately 25 minutes later at the end of 
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the study. Measurements were taken retrospectively so that the suggestion of cravings did not 
induce cravings in participants of the control condition (Kemps et al., 2008). 
Participants were asked to rate how comprehensible they found the transcript on a 100 
mm visual analogue scale anchored at 0 (“extremely easy to understand”) and 100 
(“extremely difficult to understand”). Finally, nicotine dependence was measured using the 
Fagerström Nicotine Dependence Scale (FNDS; Heatherton, Kozlowski, Frecker, & 
Fagerström, 1991), which is a six-item multiple choice questionnaire with a score of five or 
greater indicating a strong nicotine addiction. 
Results 
Screening measures 
 To ensure compliance with the deprivation instructions, participants were asked upon 
arrival to indicate how long it had been since their last cigarette (min), to provide breath 
analyses that present an immediate CO reading, and to indicate their level of nicotine 
dependence via the FNDS. One-way ANOVA indicated that compared to controls, high-
cravers reported significantly longer times since their last cigarette (high-craving: M = 197 
min, SD = 191, 95% CI [110, 284] vs. control: M = 44 min, SD = 108, 95% CI [0, 89]), F(1, 
44) = 11.64, p = .001, d = 1.01. Consistent with these self-reports, high-cravers had 
significantly lower CO readings than controls (high-craving: M = 10 ppm, SD = 5, 95% CI 
[8, 13] vs. control: M = 23 ppm, SD = 14, 95% CI [18, 29]), F(1, 44) = 17.51, p < .001, d = 
1.24. However, high-craving participants also had lower levels of nicotine dependence, as 
measured with the FNDS, than control participants (high-craving: M = 3.33, SD = 2.08, 95% 
CI [2.39, 4.28] vs. control: M = 4.80, SD = 2.60, 95% CI [3.73, 5.87]), F(1, 44) = 4.34, p = 
.043, d = .62, indicating significant between-group differences that were unanticipated due to 
random allocation. Note that any effects of the craving manipulation cannot be attributed to 
this unanticipated difference in dependence, because the lower levels of dependence in the 
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high-craving condition would have acted against the manipulation (given that lower 
dependence is associated with lesser cravings). 
Manipulation checks 
State-craving intensity  
Analysis of retrospective ratings of craving intensity showed that the craving 
manipulation was successful. A 2 (craving condition) × 3 (time) mixed ANOVA yielded a 
significant between-subjects effect, indicating that high-craving participants reported 
significantly higher retrospective craving intensities than controls (M = 56.84, SD = 18.38 vs. 
M = 22.23, SD = 18.38, respectively), F(1, 44) = 40.50, p < .001. Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of time on craving 
intensities, F(1.84, 81.07) = 29.23, p < .001, ε = .921. Within-subjects contrasts indicate that 
craving intensities consistently increased from time 1 to time 3 (see Figure 1), F(1, 44) = 
42.23, p < .001. Craving intensities for control participants remained comparatively low upon 
arrival and following the craving induction, with an increase in intensity by the end of testing, 
which may be a combined effect of cigarette deprivation and task demands. The craving 
condition × time interaction did not reach significance, F(1.84, 81.07) = 2.78, p = .073, ε = 
.921. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Trial complexity 
There was a trend toward participants reporting that the simple transcript was easier to 
understand (M = 32.04, SD = 29.33) than the complex transcript (M = 44.13, SD = 32.71), 
however this difference was not statistically significant, t(44) = -1.32, p = .194, d = .39. 
Given that the pilot test and manipulation check both yielded non-significant differences in 
perceived comprehensibility that were in the expected direction, we adopted a meta-analytic 
approach that involved analyzing the overall effect of the complexity manipulation on 
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perceived comprehensibility across both tests (Cumming, 2012a, 2014). This analysis was 
conducted using Exploratory Software for Confidence Intervals (ESCI), an Excel-based 
statistical package designed for the estimation of effects (Cumming, 2012a, 2012b). This 
analysis yielded a difference of 12.41 points 95%CI [0.76, 24.06], t = 2.09, p = .04. Thus, 
taken together, the results of the pilot test and manipulation check suggest that participants 
perceived the complex version of the transcript as more difficult than the simple version, but 
this difference was subtle. 
Memory measures 
Recall 
Raw data for the recall measure comprised free responses in sentence or dot-point 
form. Following ForsterLee et al. (1993), responses were scored on the basis of individual 
pieces of correct information recalled. For example, the sentence “one plaintiff ate fish that 
was contaminated with DBX, leading to a rare form of liver cancer” was segmented into 
individual pieces of information, where the participant would receive a point for each “one 
plaintiff ate fish”, “fish that was contaminated”, “DBX”, and “liver cancer”. The sum of these 
points represented the participant’s overall recall score. Two independent raters who were 
blind to the experimental conditions scored responses. Inter-rater reliability was high (r = .93, 
p < .001) and all discrepancies were resolved through discussion. Recall scores were 
subjected to a 2 (craving condition) × 2 (transcript complexity) ANOVA. 
 As shown in Figure 2, high-craving participants recalled fewer trial facts (M = 7.06, 
SD = 3.35, 95% CI [5.58, 8.54]) than control participants (M = 9.12, SD = 3.36, 95% CI 
[7.76, 10.47]), F(1, 42) = 4.29, p = .045, d = .61. The main effect of transcript complexity 
and craving × complexity interaction were non-significant, Fs < 1. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
D.V. Zuj et al. 14 
 
We also examined whether the craving manipulation affected the number of incorrect 
trial facts that participants recalled. Information was scored as incorrect on the basis of 
incorrectly recalling information that was in the transcript (e.g., incorrectly naming the 
chemical, DBX; incorrectly recalling the number of plaintiffs), and recalling information that 
was not in the transcript. A 2 (craving condition) × 2 (transcript complexity) ANOVA yielded 
no significant main effects of craving condition, F < 1, or transcript complexity, F(1, 42) = 
2.46, p = .124, d = .04, nor a significant interaction between these two factors, F < 1. Thus, 
the craving manipulation had no effect on the number of incorrect facts recalled by 
participants. 
We also analyzed total word count for individual recall responses to determine 
whether differences in correct recall of facts may simply reflect a reduced propensity to 
report information in the craving condition. Although participants in the craving condition 
recorded somewhat fewer words (M = 45 words, SD = 14, 95% CI [37, 53]) than participants 
in the control group (M = 54 words, SD = 20, 95% CI [47, 61]), a 2 (craving condition) × 2 
(transcript complexity) ANOVA showed no significant main effect of craving condition, F(1, 
42) = 2.64, p = .112, d = .48. The transcript complexity main effect and interaction were also 
non-significant, Fs < 1. 
Recognition 
Participant recognition responses were used to calculate estimates of discriminability 
and response bias (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 1991). Discriminability 
reflects each participant’s ability to discriminate facts from lures. Discriminability is indexed 
by the parameter dʹ, with a value of zero indicating no ability to distinguish facts from lures 
and higher values indicating greater ability. Response bias reflects each participant’s 
tendency to favor stating yes (i.e., that an item was present in the transcript) or no (i.e., that 
an item was not in the transcript). Response bias is indexed by the parameter c. A value of 
D.V. Zuj et al. 15 
 
zero indicates unbiased responding, with negative values indicating a tendency to say that 
items were present in the transcript (i.e., being too lenient in responding yes) and positive 
values indicating a tendency to say that items were not in the transcript (i.e., responding too 
conservatively). 
For discriminability estimates (dʹ values), ANOVA revealed no significant main 
effects of craving condition or complexity, and no significant craving condition × transcript 
interaction, all Fs < 1. The absence of the expected effect of craving condition on 
discriminability does not appear to be due to a lack of statistical power: the difference in dʹ 
between the control condition (M = 1.39, SD = 0.84) and high-craving condition (M = 1.24, 
SD = .74) represented an effect size of d = 0.19, which is below Cohen’s (1988) suggested 
cutoff for a small effect. This suggests that, even with a very large sample, the craving 
manipulation would have minimal effect on participants’ ability to discriminate correct trial 
facts among lures. 
For response bias (c), the craving × transcript complexity interaction approached 
significance, F(1, 42) = 3.94, p = .054. This reflected a trend toward more lenient responding 
in the high-craving condition compared to the control condition for participants who read the 
simple transcript (high-craving: -0.35 vs. control: -0.08), t(21) = 1.89, p = .073, d = 0.82, but 
not those who read the complex transcript (high-craving: -0.27 vs. control: -0.39), t < 1. The 
main effects of craving (F < 1) and complexity (F = 1.35, p = .25) were non-significant. 
Discussion 
This research demonstrates that cigarette cravings can impair recall of information in 
the context of a mock juror task. Compared with controls, high-craving participants had 
poorer recall memory for trial evidence and judicial instructions presented in a legal 
transcript. The craving manipulation did not affect participants’ recognition of information 
from the transcript, in terms of distinguishing correct facts from lures (i.e., pieces of 
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information that did not appear in the transcript), although there was a trend toward the 
craving manipulation producing more lenient responding among participants who read the 
simple version of the transcript. 
There was also a trend toward a reduction in the overall number of words recorded by 
the craving group in the recall task. This trend is certainly consistent with the notion that 
memory for trial information was poorer in the craving condition than the control condition. 
However, an alternative explanation might be that the craving manipulation did not impair 
participants’ recall of trial facts, but simply reduced participants’ willingness to report as 
much information in the recall test (perhaps because the manipulation reduced effort 
dedicated toward the task, or prompted participants to want to leave the study in order to have 
a cigarette). Although we cannot definitively rule out such an explanation, there are two 
reasons why this is unlikely to account for our data. First, if the manipulation simply reduced 
participants’ willingness to report information (via reduced effort or desire to leave the study) 
we would expect this trend to occur not only for correct facts, but also for incorrect facts. 
This was not the case: participants in the high-craving condition did not differ from those in 
the low-craving condition in the number of  incorrect facts recalled. Thus, the trend for 
craving participants to report less information overall was clearly driven by a reduction in the 
recall of correct facts. Second, because the recall task was timed (participants were required 
to spend three minutes on the task), there was no possibility that writing less would enable 
participants to leave the study sooner. Hence, the most likely explanation for our data is that 
the craving manipulation impaired participants’ recall of trial information. 
From an applied perspective, these results have clear implications for the scheduling 
of breaks in courtroom hearings. Factors that impair jurors’ memory for trial information can 
influence trial outcomes. The ease with which information can be recalled affects the extent 
to which that information affects judgments and decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
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Thus, if cravings impair the recall of important trial information, that information is less 
likely to shape individual jurors’ judgments about the case. Our results suggest that jurors 
should be given breaks sufficiently often to satisfy cigarette cravings so that processing of 
evidence is not impaired. 
These results also extend knowledge about the effects of cravings on cognition. Prior 
research has established that cravings for substances including cigarettes and food impair 
performance on basic cognitive tasks, such as response time, attention and working memory 
tasks (e.g., Gross et al., 1993; Kemps et al., 2008; Madden & Zwaan, 2001). Our research 
demonstrates that such effects translate to a more realistic cognitive task that better maps 
onto what a person might be required to do in an applied setting, in terms of memory for 
more naturalistic and narrative-driven stimulus materials. The findings provide further 
support for Tiffany’s (1990) cognitive model of cravings, in that the presence of cigarette 
cravings resulted in poorer performance on a cognitive task, which is consistent with the idea 
that cravings consume limited cognitive resources. 
Our results also align well with the broader literature demonstrating detrimental 
effects on cognition caused by dual-task performance (e.g., Baxter & Hinson, 2001; Cepeda-
Benito & Tiffany, 1996) and the exertion of self-control (Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven et 
al., 1998). It may be fruitful for future research to further examine parallels between these 
domains. For example, one interesting question relates to how quickly cognitive resources 
become available (and, hence, how quickly task performance recovers) when cravings are 
alleviated or self-control is no longer necessary. Exerting self-control depletes self-control 
resources, which then gradually replenish over time (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). This 
implies that the negative effects of self-control on cognition may persist for some time, even 
after self-control is no longer necessary. It is unclear whether the recovery of cognitive 
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performance after cravings are alleviated follows a similar time course, or occurs more 
quickly. 
There was minimal effect of the craving manipulation on discriminability in the 
recognition task, in contrast to the substantial detrimental effect of the manipulation on recall 
performance. The different effects on performance may be attributable to differences in the 
amount of cognitive resources required by the two memory tasks. There is evidence that the 
cognitive processes involved in recall require more attentional resources than the processes 
involved in recognition (e.g., Anderson, Craik, & Naveh-Benjamin, 1998). In the present 
study, it may be that cigarette cravings triggered active inhibition of action schema for 
smoking, and that this inhibition was sufficient to impair the processes involved in recall 
(which require a relatively large amount of attention) but not those involved in recognition 
(which require relatively less attention). To the extent that this account is true, the negative 
effect of cravings on cognition will be particularly evident for other naturalistic tasks that 
demand a substantial amount of attentional resources (e.g., Palmer, Brewer, McKinnon, & 
Weber, 2010). Another possible explanation is that the observed craving levels may have 
been sufficiently strong to affect recall, but not recognition. Participants in the craving group 
had been deprived of cigarettes for two hours. Following the craving induction protocol, they 
reported craving levels around the midpoint of the scale. It is possible that following a longer 
period of smoking deprivation, participants might have experienced stronger cravings, which 
might also have affected recognition performance, not just recall. However, the null effect of 
the manipulation on recognition performance was not anticipated and these explanations, 
although plausible, are speculative. 
The effect of cigarette cravings on memory performance was not moderated by the 
complexity of the trial transcript. On one hand, this result provides evidence that the effects 
of cigarette cravings on recall generalize to two sets of stimuli that differ in terms of the 
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number of plaintiffs involved and the language used. However, this result was contrary to our 
hypothesis that the effects of the craving manipulation would be stronger for the complex 
transcript than the simple trial transcript, and to the results of Zwaan and Truitt (1998) who 
found that the effects of cravings on language comprehension were greater on a more 
difficult task compared to an easier one. 
The lack of an interaction effect in the current study may be attributable to the 
subtlety of the complexity manipulation. Although the results of pilot testing and a 
manipulation check, taken together, indicated that participants perceived the complex version 
of the transcript as more difficult to understand than the simple version, this difference was 
small (approximately 12 points on a scale of 1-100). Consistent with the notion that the 
complexity manipulation was subtle, a post-hoc analysis of language readability using the 
Gunning Fog Index (GFI; Gunning, 1979) showed that the simple and complex transcripts 
require the equivalent of 13.51 and 13.50 years of education for comprehension, respectively. 
At first glance, this suggests that a stronger complexity manipulation may have produced the 
predicted interaction (with stronger effects of the craving manipulation for a more complex 
transcript than a less complex one). However, as shown in Figure 2, the pattern of means 
suggests that the effect of cravings was—if anything—stronger among participants who read 
the simple transcript than the complex one (i.e., the opposite to the predicted pattern). Thus, 
our recall data do not support the notion that cravings may have stronger effects on jurors’ 
recall of complex evidence than simple evidence. This suggests that in at least some applied 
settings, like jury duty, even relatively simple tasks are affected by cravings. 
While this is the first study that has investigated the effect of cravings in a real-world 
task, there are some limitations that open avenues for future research. First, greater 
manipulation of task complexity to create a clear difference in the required cognitive effort 
may reveal a significant effect of cravings. Second, the difference in results for recall versus 
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recognition memory may translate to other forms of cognition. For example, research has 
demonstrated that cigarette cravings reduce working memory ability (Madden & Zwaan, 
2001), which may show stronger impairments compared to recall memory due to differences 
in cognitive requirements. Third, the present study only included current smokers; future 
research could examine whether smokers and non-smokers differ in performance on applied 
tasks that require cognitive resources.  
Finally, the present results have implications for applied settings in which people may 
experience cravings due to having limited access to craved substances such as cigarettes, 
food, and coffee. Our data represent the first step toward demonstrating that the detrimental 
effects of cravings on performance of basic cognitive tasks translate to performance on more 
realistic, everyday cognitive tasks. Our study specifically examined the effects of cigarette 
cravings on jurors’ memory for realistic information from a civil case. However, to the extent 
that these results generalize to other tasks and other cravings (e.g., food, coffee), they have 
implications for any setting in which people experience cravings while undertaking important 
tasks that require cognitive resources. Our results suggest that in any such situation, policies 
and practices regarding the scheduling of breaks should take into account potential effects of 
cravings on cognition. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Craving intensity as a function of craving condition reported retrospectively for 
Time 1 (arrival at laboratory), Time 2 (immediately post-manipulation), and Time 3 (the end 
of the study). Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. 
Figure 2. Recall Scores as a Function of Craving Intensity and Transcript Complexity. Error 
bars show 95% confidence intervals. 
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